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ABSTRACT
Intellectual Property (IP) based Integrated Circuit (IC) design is an established approach for
the design of a complex System-on-Chip (SoC). Porting the preparatory designs to third-party with-
out enough security margin exposes an attacker to perform reverse engineering (RE) on the designs
and hence counterfeiting, IP theft etc., are common now-a-days. Design obfuscation can reduce
RE attempt by an attacker. In this work, we propose a key based obfuscation and anonymization
method for a behavioral IP. Given a behavioral VHDL description, the assignment and conditional
statements are modified by incorporating random boolean operations with unique random key bits.
The obfuscated VHDL is then anonymized by random identifiers. The resultant behavioral model
can be simulated correctly upon application of original key sequence. Simulation results with nine
datapath intensive benchmarks with three different lengths of test sequences show that the simula-
tion overhead is negligible (only a few seconds). We evaluate the probability of reverse engineering
the obfuscated design and show that it is extremely low.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
With more building blocks being deployed as Intellectual Property (IP), the problem in re-
gards to their security is also increasing. These are more vulnerable to malicious activities which
decreases the hardware protection. Some of the malicious activities are Trojan injection, unautho-
rized over production, and alteration of the code. Trojan injections can cause a major problem.
Once, these are injected, they can be triggered at any time, even during the execution. IC designs
are easy targets to the hardware Trojans as they are vulnerable (for eg., due to design outsourcing)
and can cause malicious alterations to the circuit. Unauthorized over production occurs when the IP
is used or accessed more than required or mentioned without the prior knowledge of the IP owner.
For these reasons, protection and security of the hardware has become important in recent
times. Hardware protection primarily provides security against malicious activities like code mod-
ifications to increase the difficulty of reverse engineering. At the same time, it also decreases the
occurrence of Trojan insertion.
Many methods have been proposed till date to protect the hardware. Encryption of the
hardware at behavioral level can be done by changing the names with the help of the keys. Gate
level security is achieved by introduction of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and multiplexers
which complicate the design process but does not change the functionality. Physical level security
can be achieved by changing the doping concentration of the material. These methods have their
own drawbacks such as increasing the time complexity to simulate a program, usage of more power
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Figure 1.1: Reverse Engineering
than required thus making it less power efficient, and so on. From all these, it is clear that a time
and power efficient method is needed.
To achieve an efficient tool that is least vulnerable to attacks, the probability of reverse
engineering should be decreased. Reverse engineering can be best explained with the help of Figure
1.1. Consider a design is forward engineered to get its implemented. The process of re-creating the
design from the implementation by transforming the implementation is called reverse engineering.
To protect the original design, reverse engineering should be hard for the attacker. That
means, even though the attacker can get the data, she cannot access it unless she does reverse
engineering. To mitigate reverse engineering of the design, one of the techniques used is to obfuscate
the design, which is an easy and inexpensive way. Obfuscation is very common in software. Software
obfuscation is performed by renaming the identifiers and encrypting the functionality of the code.
Obfuscation incorporates additional code in the original program without modifying the
functionality of the program. It should be implemented tactfully in such a way that the attacker
cannot understand the code for reverse engineering. Security against hardware trojans can also be
achieved through obfuscation. Anonymization, on the other hand, means renaming the variables of
2
the program so that reverse engineering becomes merely impossible for the attacker. In this work,
we propose a key based obfuscation and anonymization method for behavioral VHDL IP models.
In the proposed approach, even if a third party tries to over produce the code illegally,
it cannot be accessed by the users as the key is only disclosed to legitimate users. Due to this
type of implementation, illegal over production would be drastically reduced. Difficulty of reverse
engineering is inversely proportional to the level of vulnerability i.e., the increase in difficulty of
reverse engineering the IP model, decreases the malicious activities such as modifying the code.
Not only protection of the IP model is achieved but also, it has been noted that the overhead
occurred is only a few seconds.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of hardware
trojans, obfuscation and various techniques used to resist reverse engineering at different abstraction
levels. Chapter 3 presents in detail the proposed method for key-based obfuscation and anonymiza-
tion. Chapter 4 reports the experimental results. Finally, Chapter 5 draws conclusions.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Hardware obfuscation is a technique used for protecting the design from untrusted execution.
It increases the difficulty to understand, to read, and also to modify the functionality of IC/IP model.
Software obfuscation is also a similar technique which is used for protecting the logic from third
party by generating a machine code so that it will increase the difficulty for reverse engineering.
There are many automated tools available for software obfuscation.
Software obfuscation is widely used when compared to that of hardware. Nearly everything
in software is ensured by obfuscation which is not the case in hardware design. It is quite challenging
to create a tool for different abstraction layers of the hardware. The design that is obtained after
obfuscation turns out mildly complex but it will also become exceptionally protected. Hardware
obfuscation is very much distinctive when compared to software obfuscation. In software obfusca-
tion, the structure of the code is modified or altered where as in hardware, the providing protection
to the functionality of the code is main concern.
This chapter reviews existing methods at behavioral-, RT-, gate-, and layout-levels for hard-
ware obfuscation. It also reviews popular software obfuscation techniques currently in practice.
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2.1 Behavioral-level Obfuscation
When obfuscating an IP, a functionally equivalent source file is compiled, which is highly
difficult for humans to understand by just viewing the source file and thus is extremely difficult
to perform reverse engineering on. Veeranna and Schafer [1] had designed an obfuscation tool for
behavioral IP source code to decrease Quality of Results (QoR) degradation due to the obfusca-
tion. The authors proposed two methods based on Genetic Algorithm (GA) and iterative greedy
algorithm. The obfuscation based on Genetic Algorithm has two steps. The first step involves
Dp
Dq
Dc
Dm
D1
D2
D3
Dp
D5
D4
Dn
Dq
Line1 Line2 LineN
Line1 Line2 LineN
Line1 Line2 LineN
Line1 Line2 LineN
Source code
Step 1
Step 2
Figure 2.1: Genetic Algorithm
initial population generation, where a random line in the behavior IP is parsed. After parsing that
line, a decision is taken whether or not to obfuscate that line and the probability is noted. Then,
generation of offspring is carried out. This uses two functions, mutation and crossover. Mutation
simply flips the lines of the code in the offspring and crossover happens on two designs of the parent
which are chosen randomly from the population. Figure 2.1 depicts the two steps in the algorithm.
D1, D2,... are the designs from which the lines are randomly chosen whether to obfuscate or not.
Dc and Dm are the crossover and mutation designs.
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Fast iterative-greedy technique provides more appropriate QoR and obfuscation level with a
single design. This predominantly conveys which of the obfuscation has better QoR. This method
has three steps. In the first step the line numbers are extracted where obfuscation has been achieved
in a completely obfuscated file. In the second step, all of these lines obtained are analyzed to
determine which of them contribute to QoR. Finally, in the third step, a new behavioral IP is
generated with the lines contributing to less QoR degradation. It was observed that the iterative-
greedy method produced more efficient obfuscation and had lesser run time when compared to GA.
2.2 Register Transfer (RT-) Level Obfuscation Methods
Castillo et. al., [2] proposed a high level design protection scheme, namely, IPP@HDL. It uses
electronic signature to protect the designer rights in the development and distribution of reusable
VHDL modules. The procedure relies upon facilitating the bits of the digital signature inside
memory structures or in combinational circuits that are a part of the framework. Two strategies,
namely, signature embedding and signature hosting are used. These follow the process, signature
preparation, spreading, extraction and validation. Error correction codes, additional logic tasks for
detecting signature extraction, and strategies to host signatures methods are analyzed to combat
the tampering attacks. Storage of the signature bytes costs additional hardware which limits the
application of this method.
Islam and Katkoori [3] proposed a key based RTL obfuscation during high-level synthesis
(HLS). The CDFG of the behavioral description of the design is analyzed and obfuscation points are
embedded with random keys. Multiplexers based keys are stored in additional registers available
in RTL datapath. The algorithm consists of two steps. First, all the operations of CDFG are
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analyzed for possible obfuscation points. Then, a random operation along with input or output line
is selected for all the obfuscation key bits and are replaced with a multiplexer. Inputs to the design
are increased by randomly passing a line from the design as an input along with the original inputs.
Compared to other techniques, this obfuscation technique has less performance overhead.
INIT
rst
myreg2:=3'b0
en
myreg2:=bmyreg2:=a+b
N
N Y
Y
INIT
rst
myreg2:=3'b0
en
myreg2:=b
N
N Y
Y
cond2
myreg2:=-(a+b)myreg2:=a+b
N Y
Original CDFG
Obfuscated CDFG
Figure 2.2: RT-level Obfuscation
For RTL obfuscation, Chakraborty and Bhunia [4] proposed low-overhead key-based IP pro-
tection. The obfuscation scheme is comprised of four steps. First, blocks of RTL code is parsed and
transformed into CDFG. These small CDFGs are merged to generate a larger CDFG. The next part
is to host the mode-control FSM by distributing the elements into registers non-contiguously. The
third step is to modify the CDFG branches by using control signals from step two and embedded
with additional states to hold the obfuscation key. The number of states required increases linearly
with the size of key.
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Figure 2.2 shows an illustrative example of the original and modified version of CDFG.
Additional key based clause is added at the end so that passing a correct key value as input can
only produce the correct output. Finally, obfuscated RTL code is generated from the modified
CDFG. This mechanism not only prevents IP infringement but also incurs low design overhead.
Koteshwara et. al., [5] presented a dynamic approach to produce an inconsistent circuit
behavior when an incorrect key is applied. It increases the time complexity of deciphering and
decoding of the correct key while implementing a brute-force attack on it, even if shorter key
lengths are used. Key based obfuscation is achieved by adding fixed key bits to the multiplexers
of the control flow, time variant based on the input key value and circuit triggering at random
time duration for every incorrect key. Trigger circuits are designed to withstand the hardware
Trojans using counters. Whenever a Trojan is activated, the signal behaves differently due to
trigger modifications. This activates a delay counter and when this overflows, a final counter is
incremented which is served as an input to the trigger generator circuit. Through this approach,
controls overheads are reduced.
2.3 Gate-level Obfuscation Methods
Chakraborty and Bhunia proposed HARPOON (HARdware Protection through Obfuscation
of Netlist) [6], an obfuscation methodology for gate-level netlist of pre-synthesized IP core. Here,
obfuscation and authentication are provided by modifying the soft IP core. Obfuscation is used
to reduce reverse engineering. During obfuscation procedure, a small finite state machine (FSM)
is inserted into the state-transition function of the circuit. This FSM will work normally only
when specific input sequence is received. It also modifies the chosen nodes. The chosen nodes are
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those having higher fan-out logic cone. For each of the correct input sequence, a digital signature
is embedded into the output. Identifying the correct input from these signatures is hard. The
HARPOON design methodology is applied for selecting the optimal set of nodes for modification
using ranking algorithm. The approach gives a piracy-proof design flow but uses control blocks
which require additional area as it fails to analyze the security vulnerable nets of IP core and inserts
random key insertion.
Chakraborty and Bhunia [7] also presented obfuscation for protection against hardware tro-
jan with additional states in state transition graph. Obfuscation is done by modifying the state
transition graph which provided enhanced protection against hardware trojans.
Tehranipoor and Koushanfar [8] presented several trojan detection techniques. The method
includes side-channel analysis or Trojan activation at the chip-level and architectural level. Chip-
level trojan detection process merges with power analysis which includes region-free and region-
aware trojan activation schemes. Architectural-level trojan detection scheme involves balancing of
if-else statements without changing the execution time and power. These techniques can be used
at design phase to detect a trojan. Once a trojan is detected, it can be removed.
The obfuscation methodology in [7], involves triggering an arc which connects the normal
nodes from the obfuscated state transition graph. All the node states which are reachable are blown
up by exponential functions using state elements making them unreachable and the states which are
unreachable are made reachable in the obfuscated mode. To decrease the probability of finding the
unreachable nodes, the obfuscated state space is made larger by inserting excessive state elements.
This makes reverse engineering infeasible for the attacker.
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PUF based Challenge-Response Pairs (CRPs) [9] are proposed for unique secret key gener-
ation to be used in combinational and sequential logic obfuscation. In combinational logic obfus-
cation, a part of the original circuit is replaced with a delay-based PUF along with configurable
logic circuit. In order to increase the security of the circuit, the delay PUF must be placed where
high-activity and timing-stressed regions are not present. This is because of the unstable nature of
PUF. A challenge (n-bit) is given to PUF to make it stable.
M
U
X
PUF
input
output
clk
D
>
Q
Q`
n
challenge x
Figure 2.3: Gate-level Obfuscation of D Flip-flop
In sequential logic obfuscation, the outputs of the flip-flop are obfuscated to make the correct
output indistinguishable from the wrong one. Figure 2.3 determines the modifications done to D
flip-flop in order to obfuscate the output of the flip-flop. Here, an n-bit PUF is added to the mul-
tiplexer for obfuscation. The obfuscation should done keeping the delay overhead in mind. Given
the unstable nature of PUF and constant prediction of PUF output, obfuscation is less effective.
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Dofe and Yu [10] presented state deflection method for Finite State Machines (FSMs). In this
approach, during a wrong key application, it would dynamically deflect state transitions from the
allowable transition path to a black hole cluster. Multiple states are merged to create a black hole
and every black hole is mapped to a wrong key. These black holes remain unstable by constantly
shifting to other states. Obfuscation is done on the gate-level netlist without the prior knowledge
of the original states and signals. This is done by adding additional input signals to the FSM and
changing the state bits. If an original state is categorized as a black hole, the output bit is flipped.
The key sequence is checked at every state transition. Although this methodology has high success
rate in obfuscation, it is limited due to the hardware cost.
2.4 Physical-level Obfuscation Methods
Layout-level obfuscation methods involve camouflaging and change in physical parameters
to the circuit components. Vijaykumar et al. [11], presented an outline of low-level obfuscation
method to protect against image recognition attack. Obfuscating the hardware at physical level
has a very large design space. Obfuscation is mainly based on stealthy circuits. These circuits
have distinct logic function for the original and the one which is extracted after performing reverse
engineering. This is a three layer model of which the bottom layer (device-level mechanism) and
middle layer (logic-level mechanism) can be used for physical design obfuscation. The top layer has
obfuscation techniques which are at the gate-level.
The bottom layer has device-level mechanisms which re-size the transistors based on its
group. The groups are classified depending on the type of effect i.e., stuck-at-faults, stealthy sig-
naling, and delay manipulation. Device-level techniques focus on the creation of stuck-at and delay
11
faults to harness the reverse engineering. Stuck-at faults can be created by changing the doping
concentration in the transistor. This is illustrated in Figure 2.4. The source and drain of the
original PMOS transistor is doped with n-type which produces a constant output causing stuck-at
faults. The most significant mechanisms in which this can be achieved are device specific mecha-
nisms, where source or channel doping is done. Few of them are interconnect specific mechanisms,
where inter-layer dielectric and inter-connect can be manipulated and dummy logic can be inserted.
Mechanisms where usage of crosstalk or manipulations done on stealthy signaling and timing faults
using lithographic printable features are also used.
N-well
P-type 
dopant
P- type 
dopant
Source DrainGate
N-well
N-type 
dopant
N- type 
dopant
Source DrainGate
Original PMOS Transistor Obfuscated Transistor 
(constant output)
Figure 2.4: An Illustrative Example of Physical-level Obfuscation
The middle layer has logic-level mechanisms which are focused on circuit structures formed
from manipulations of the bottom layer. These circuits intervene between the device-level mecha-
nisms and complex logic functions. The techniques used for obfuscating the logic-level mechanisms
are circuit transformations which include CMOS circuits, pass transistors, dynamic logic, Differ-
ential Cascode Voltage Switch (DCVS) logic, and flip-flops. Promotion of physical mechanism to
logic level which include look-up tables, Programmable Logic Array (PLA) cross points, and usage
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of gate functions which are restricted and countermeasures for obfuscation mechanism. All these
mechanisms provide hardness and stealthiness to the obfuscation of the low-level design.
2.5 Software Obfuscation
JAVA has been the most used programming languages of all times and it still continues to be
the best one because of it is open, well defined, and portable. These factors also make it vulnerable
to reverse engineering attacks. To counter this we use obfuscation techniques to make the program
less readable and more complex to understand by others making this the most secured way to write
a program. Software obfuscation can be explained with the help of Figure 2.5. As shown, the
original source code is sent through the obfuscation tool as an executable file to the user. If an
attacker tries to de-compile the file, she cannot retrieve the original file, thus securing the original
one.
read(a)
read(b)
print(a+b)
11010101
00001110
10101001
11000111
11010101
00001110
10101001
11000111
suynmaloc
aynknksio
aoplmrtcv
Software Obfuscator 
and Compiler
De-compile
IP Owner
Attacker
End User
Figure 2.5: Software Obfuscation
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The obfuscation technique used in JIRO [12] is an identifier renaming algorithm. It uses
four different algorithms each of them receiving an input source ‘x’ and generated target code ‘x’.
All these algorithms have three main steps in common, overusing identifiers, overloading unrelated
methods, and introducing illegal identifiers.
Overusing identifiers uses randomly generated identifier names instead of using the sequence
names. This increases the difficulty of static attacks and at the same time increasing the difficulty to
reverse engineer the program. Overloading unrelated method renames the methods of the compiled
class with same identifier by considering the complexity of inheritance relation between the sub class
and super class. Illegal identifier obfuscation method uses purely keywords and string of keywords
combined with illegal characters to replace the common identifiers. This results in a relationship
between the size of the program and the obfuscation effects. These have a direct impact with the
size of the original program. It can be seen that with the help of the tool developed, the JAVA
program can be protected. By this way, the complexity of the program code sharply rises and thus
increases the compilation time for the code as well. This procedure can be implemented in hardware
obfuscation.
2.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, obfuscation techniques at different levels for hardware and software are de-
scribed. At behavior-level, changes are done to the identifiers. CDFGs are modified at RT-level.
At gate-level, PUFs are introduced and at physical-level, doping concentrations are modified.
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Although all these approaches provide security against attacks, they propose a complex
way to perform obfuscation of a program and hence the time taken for a defender also increases
with the obfuscation level. Assuming man-in-the-middle attack for a behavioral IP, we propose
an automated approach to obfuscate the VHDL model followed by anonymization with reasonable
runtime overhead (few seconds) which will be discussed in next Chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: PROPOSED APPROACH
When an IP owner sends his/her proprietary design to fabrication facility, an attacker during
system integration can spoof the design and alter the functionality without explicit knowledge of
parties involved. We mimic such attack model as man-in-the-middle attack. Although the IP owner
and the end user may think that the design is unaltered, attacker may reverse engineer the design
for IP theft, counterfeiting etc., or embed HT due to lack of centralized control in the supply chain.
To reduce reverse engineering attempt for an attacker, obfuscation and anonymization can enable
the designer to protect behavioral VHDL model of a design. The obfuscation and anonymization
tool developed helps in reducing the attack depicted in Figure 3.1.
IP Owner
Obfuscation and 
Anonymization
End User
Third Party
Figure 3.1: Man-in-the-Middle Attack Model
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3.1 Proposed Framework
We propose key-based obfuscation and anonymization technique to protect the functionality
of a behavioral VHDL model from reverse engineering.
Obfuscation can hide the functionality of a code given a number of key and their length. In
our work, the given VHDL code is passed through a parser, built in lex and yacc, which generates
a key based obfuscated VHDL model of the original code. Figure 3.2 shows the overall flow. We
incorporate random boolean operations with random key bits in the assignment and conditional
evaluation statements of the original VHDL without any change in original function.
AnonymizationKey-Based Obfuscator Simulator
Obfuscation Key
VHDL 
Key Inputs
Output
Figure 3.2: Proposed Obfuscation and Anonymization Flow
Next, we perform anonymization as design sanitization for privacy protection. In our work,
it is a process of renaming the identifiers so that it becomes difficult for the attacker to find out
which of the identifiers (ports in VHDL) are the key and inputs/outputs. The previous key-based
obfuscated VHDL is now anonymized with random identifiers of a certain length. The key during
obfuscation is provided by the IP designer in boolean format and hence, the generated VHDL of the
first step changes dynamically. The obfuscated behavioral model can be simulated correctly only
when the valid key is applied.
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Unlike, any other obfuscator, we are using a key-based obfuscator which uses designer spec-
ified key length and are also dynamic in nature. That is, once the designer embeds key in the
behavioral VHDL and generates the obfuscated model, model will be functionally correct only for
that particular key. Any other key will result in wrong output. This way the VHDL model is secure.
To keep the key and input-output identifier indistinguishable, obfuscated model is anonymized fur-
ther. Hence, the hardware is protected from reverse engineering. The two steps are explained in
detail in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.
Data: V= Original VHDL, L= Key-length, Keys
Result: Obfuscated VHDL
// Step 1 - Identifying 0s and 1s in keys
for bits k_i in keys do
separate 0’s and 1’s from the keys
end
Add keys as input in port declaration
// Step 2 - Parse the VHDL code
for line in V do
I ← random number generation from the respected 0’s
and 1’s in the keys
//I value changes randomly each time
if line = assignment_statement then
//Modify the statement by adding boolean
operations
variable = (((expression) XOR K1(I))AND(K2(I)
OR K2(I)))XOR K1(I);
end
if line = conditional_statement then
Add "IF(K1(I) = 1) then
set_of_instructions
END IF;"
end
end
Figure 3.3: Key Based Obfuscation Algorithm
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3.1.1 Key Based Obfuscation Step
To obfuscate a VHDL model, we perform XOR and AND operations on keys and embed them
into the assignment statements. Figure 3.3 shows the algorithm to perform such obfuscation. The
algorithm takes the original VHDL, key length and the key as inputs and produces the obfuscated
VHDL as the output. It performs obfuscation in two stages. First, the 0’s and 1’s are separated
from the key. Keys are then added as inputs in port declaration of the original VHDL along with a
few dummy keys to disguise the original key from the attacker for a fixed key length. Step 1 in the
algorithm takes constant time to complete due to the for loop. Step 2 needs O(n) time where n is
the lines in the model. Hence, the total time complexity of the algorithm is O(n).
B
C
K2(7)
K1(1)
K2(4)
K1(2)
A
Figure 3.4: Obfuscation of OR Gate
While parsing the original VHDL file, if there is an assignment statement, it is concatenated
with a series of boolean operations. For example, if “C=A” is an assignment statement, the cor-
responding obfuscated version will be “C = ((A XOR K1(1)) AND K2(6)) XOR K1(4)”. The
particular index of the key will be random (0 or 1) depending on the key value. Figure 3.4 shows
an obfuscated form of a two-input “AND” gate. Here, the expression (A = B AND C) can be
transformed to “A = (((B AND C) XOR K1(2)) AND (K2(4) AND K2(7))) XOR K1(1)”. If B
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IF (counter == 10) THEN
A = B OR C
ELSE
A = B AND C
END IF;
IF (K1(5) =1) THEN
IF counter = 10 THEN
A = (((B OR C) XOR K1(0) )AND (K2(7) AND K2(3)))XOR K1(4);
ELSE
A = (((B AND C) XOR K1(2) )AND (K2(4) AND K2(7)))XOR K1(1);
END IF;
END IF;
Key based Obfuscator
Original VHDL Code Snippet
Key Based VHDL Code Snippet
Figure 3.5: Obfuscation Step
and C are n-bit identifiers, random keys are concatenated to get the required n-bit and appended
to the regular expression of the gate.
If a conditional statement is found, we insert another conditional statement to check the
value of a particular index in given key sequence before the current conditional statement. For
example, “if (C == A) then C = 0” is the conditional statement, it is obfuscated to “if(K1(5) == 1)
then if (C == A) then C = 0” by inserting an additional if clause. Figure 3.5 shows an example of
obfuscation for a conditional code block. As the particular value corresponding to the index of any
key in input is unknown, the attacker has to enumerate all possible key values and the positional
value as well.
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3.1.2 Anonymization Step
Anonymization is done such that a functional equivalent source is compiled and formulated
for the given source, which is highly difficult or say impossible for humans to understand by just
viewing the source file and is extremely difficult to reverse-engineer through different on-line and
off-line tools. We carry the anonymization step with specified length of random string m. In this
process, the identifiers are renamed and hence, the difficulty of reverse engineering increases linearly
with the identifier length.
Data: V= Obfuscated VHDL,
m=anonymized-string-length
Result: Key Based Obfuscated and Anonymised VHDL
// Step 1 - Create a table for identifiers
Table[id, old_value, new_value]
// Step-2 - Search for an identifier
for identified iden in V do
if identifier = (old_value) in table then
iden = new_value;
else
Add Table [id, iden, random(id, m)]
iden = new_value;
end
end
Figure 3.6: Anonymization Algorithm
The pseudo-code of the anonymization algorithm is shown in Figure 3.6. It takes the ob-
fuscated VHDL from Section 3.1.1 as input and generates an anonymized VHDL model as output.
The algorithm performs anonymization in two stages. First, a 2-dimensional table is created for the
identifiers. While parsing the obfuscated VHDL, if an identifier is found in the table, the anonymised
value is taken from the table, else a random string is generated for that identifier and inserted to
the table. For example, “A : IN BIT” can be anonymized as “hnjksgthenbd : IN BIT” by an m-bit
random string.
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The anonymization algorithm takesO(1) time for step 1 as the size of the addition of identifier
to the table can be performed in constant time. Step 2 has a time complexity of O(n) where n is
the number of identifiers in the model. Hence, the total time complexity of the algorithm is O(n).
Figure 3.7 shows anonymization of the key-based obfuscated code from Figure 3.5.
IF (K1(5) =1) THEN
IF counter = 10 THEN
A = (((B OR C) XOR K1(0) )AND (K2(7) AND K2(3)))XOR K1(4);
ELSE
A = (((B AND C) XOR K1(2) )AND (K2(4) AND K2(7)))XOR K1(1);
END IF;
END IF;
IF (hnjksgthenbd(5) =1) THEN
IF bxnngepkujeo = 10 THEN
imevffxqngpc  = (((pwjvnxrontbc  OR syzqhtaqjjra) XOR hnjksgthenbd(0) 
)AND (zywtombghwlu(7) AND zywtombghwlu(3)))XOR hnjksgthenbd(4);
ELSE
imevffxqngpc  = (((pwjvnxrontbc  AND syzqhtaqjjra) XOR hnjksgthenbd(2) 
)AND (zywtombghwlu(4) AND zywtombghwlu(7)))XOR hnjksgthenbd (1);
END IF;
END IF;
Anonymizer
Key Based VHDL Code Snippet
Anonymized VHDL Code
Figure 3.7: Anonymization Step
3.2 Difficulty to Reverse Engineer
We evaluate the resilience of the proposed obfuscation and anonymization technique. Re-
silience determines the withstanding capability of obfuscated and anonymized VHDL against at-
tacker attempt. If m is the number of input bits and k is the number of bits in obfuscation key
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used in the model, the attacker has to try different combinations to know the key. The search is
augmented by different ways of arranging k keys intom+k bit registers. The resilience of obfuscated
VHDL model can be given by the following equation:
P (m,k) = 1(m+k
k
)2k (3.1)
Table 3.1 shows the resilience value for different benchmarks with various key bits. Lower
value of P increases the difficulty for the attacker to correctly guess the the keys and their location
in registers. With a larger number of key size and number of input bits, the attackers need more
resources (computational time and effort) to reverse engineer the design.
Table 3.1: Resilience Table (see Equation 3.1)
Design Original VHDL Obfuscated VHDL
k=0 8 bit 16 bit 32 bit
m P m P m P m P
ellip8 64 1 96 7.83E-36 128 2.26E-57 192 4.05E-91
ellip16 128 1 160 5.01E-44 192 7.47E-72 256 5.09E-115
ellip32 256 1 288 7.30E-53 320 2.79E-88 384 4.81E144
fir8 80 1 112 2.22E-38 144 8.87E-62 208 3.36E-98
fir16 160 1 192 8.14E-47 224 5.79E-77 288 7.42E-124
fir32 320 1 352 8.49E-56 384 7.20E-94 448 2.79E-154
latt8 64 1 96 7.83E-36 128 2.26E-57 192 4.05E-91
latt16 128 1 160 5.01E-44 192 7.47E-72 256 5.09E-115
latt32 256 1 288 7.30E-53 320 2.79E-88 384 4.81E-144
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3.3 Chapter Summary
We presented in detail the proposed approach of the obfuscation and anonymization methods
for the behavior VHDL models. The two main steps of the process flow are explained with algorithms
and examples. The resilience is calculated for the original and the obfuscated VHDL models to
show the difficulty level for doing reverse engineering. The overhead is calculated by measuring the
simulation time for all of the VHDL models.
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CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Nine datapath intensive benchmarks are modified by using different key lengths. The be-
havioral description of these benchmarks are written in VHDL and have entity, port declarations,
signals, process(s), variable declarations, assignment statements, conditional evaluations, loop state-
ments, and wait statements. Table 4.1 shows these benchmark models number of input and output
ports, number of variables and number of assignment statements present in the VHDL model.
The obfuscation of these benchmarks is done by using three different key lengths which are,
8, 16, and 32. The test-benches created for these benchmarks along with the original file contain
5, 1K, and 10K test vectors. These files are simulated to get the output and simulation time is
calculated. Table 4.2 shows the time taken to simulate the test benches having 5 test vectors with
different key values. Table 4.3 shows the time taken to simulate the test benches having 1K test
vectors with different key values. Table 4.4 shows the time taken to simulate the test benches having
10K test vectors with different key values.
Table 4.1: Benchmark Details
Design Ports Variables Statements
# inputs # outputs
ellip 8 8 29 37
fir 10 1 8 9
latt 8 3 12 15
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Table 4.2: Simulation Time for 5 Test Vector Sequence
Design Original User Simulation Time (sec)
(sec) 8-bit Overhead 16-bit Overhead 32-bit Overhead
ellip8 0.72 074 0.02 0.76 0.04 0.77 0.05
ellip16 0.72 0.77 0.05 0.78 0.06 0.79 0.07
ellip32 0.71 0.81 0.10 0.83 0.12 0.84 0.13
fir8 0.69 0.71 0.02 0.71 0.02 0.74 0.05
fir16 0.72 0.74 0.02 0.75 0.03 0.75 0.03
fir32 0.73 0.74 0.01 0.75 0.02 0.75 0.02
latt8 0.70 0.72 0.02 0.73 0.03 0.74 0.04
latt16 0.71 0.75 0.04 0.75 0.04 0.75 0.04
latt32 0.72 0.75 0.03 0.76 0.04 0.78 0.06
Table 4.3: Simulation Time for 1K Test Vector Sequence
Design Original User Simulation Time (sec)
(sec) 8-bit Overhead 16-bit Overhead 32-bit Overhead
ellip8 2.29 3.06 0.77 3.11 0.82 3.28 0.99
ellip16 2.49 3.22 0.73 3.28 0.79 3.39 0.90
ellip32 2.65 3.51 0.86 3.61 0.96 3.72 1.07
fir8 2.63 3.43 0.80 3.49 0.86 3.62 0.99
fir16 2.77 3.57 0.80 3.63 0.86 3.78 1.01
fir32 3.09 3.89 0.80 3.92 0.83 4.03 0.94
latt8 2.26 3.02 0.76 3.11 0.85 3.25 0.99
latt16 2.43 3.17 0.74 3.27 0.84 3.36 0.93
latt32 2.62 3.42 0.80 3.55 0.93 3.63 1.01
26
Table 4.4: Simulation Time for 10K Test Vector Sequence
Design Original User Simulation Time (sec)
(sec) 8-bit Overhead 16-bit Overhead 32-bit Overhead
ellip8 7.54 10.98 3.44 11.24 3.70 11.66 4.12
ellip16 8.05 11.50 3.45 11.74 3.69 12.16 4.11
ellip32 8.94 12.52 3.58 12.78 3.84 3.14 4.20
fir8 9.04 12.63 3.59 12.90 3.86 13.45 4.41
fir16 9.65 13.16 3.51 13.40 3.75 13.80 4.15
fir32 10.56 14.18 3.61 14.34 3.77 14.79 4.22
latt8 7.53 10.91 3.38 11.07 3.54 11.51 3.98
latt16 8.04 11.37 3.33 11.58 3.54 11.99 3.95
latt32 8.82 12.27 3.45 12.63 3.81 12.93 4.11
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Figure 4.1: Overhead of Designs for 32-bit Key
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It is observed that the user time difference between the original and the key based obfuscated
VHDL models is only a few seconds. The average overhead for 5, 1000, and 10K test vectors is 0.04,
0.88, and 3.78 seconds respectively. Figure 4.1 shows the overhead for all designs with 5, 1K and
10K test vectors and 32-bit key length.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
The main agenda of our work is to mitigate reverse engineering of the IP based IC designs
for which, we have implemented an obfuscation tool with lex and yacc for behavior VHDL. We
successfully demonstrated the key-based obfuscation and anonymization of the behavioral VHDL to
protect from malicious attacks and has reduced the probability of reverse engineering by brute-force
attacks and is quantified by a resilience metric. The proposed work had given very less overhead,
few seconds, when experimented with nine data path intensive design benchmarks.
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